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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

Case Nos. 18235 and 18236

vs.
ROBERT JORDAN, JR. and
TERRY FULLMER
---0000000---

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
---0000000---

APDITIONAL STATEMENT ON APPEAL
Since the filing by Appellants of their original brief in
this matter, the United States Supreme Court has made a major
ruling affecting, to some degree, the issues involved in the
In addition to other cases relied on by

matter at hand.

Appellants in their original brief, we cited the New York Case of
.E.e.QQ.l e v s • F e.I..btl , s 2 N. Y• 2 a 6 7 4 , 4 3 9 N. Y. s. 2 a 8 6 3 ( N. Y. 1 9 81 ) an a

other similar cases in which "child pornography laws" were struck
down by various courts as being overbroad.

As has been referred

to at some length by Respondents, People ys. Ferber, was recently
reversed
N..e.l:l_YQil ys.

by

the

Fe.t:~,

further examine the

United

_u.s._,

~w

States

Supreme

Court

31 Cr.L.R. 3139 (1982).

in

It is to

York ys. Ferber opinion, and answer other

contentions made by Respondent,

that Appellants file this reply

brief.

1
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RECENT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASE OF ~ I..QEK ~
DOES NOT AFFECT THE ARGUMENTS OF APPELLANTS THAT THE
STATUTE AT ISSUE IS INVALID ON ITS FACT AS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
INFRINGEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH.

f~~E

The case of New York ys. Ferber. supra:
arose when Paul Ferber, the proprietor of a
Manhattan bookstore specializing in sexually oriented products, sold two films to an
undercover police officer. The films are
devoted almost exclusviely to depicting young
boys masturbating. Ferber was indicted on
two counts of section 263.10 and two counts
of
section 263.15, the two New York laws
controlling dissemination of child
pornography. After a jury trial, Ferber was
acquitted of the two counts of promoting an
obscene sexual performance, but found guilty
of the two counts under
263.15, which did
not require proof that the films were obscene. 31 Cr.L. at 3140.
Mr. Fe£ber appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division of
the New York State supreme Court, which affirmed (72 A.D.2d 558,
424 N.Y.S.2d,

967) and then to the New York Court of Appeals,

which reversed, holding that section 263.15 violated the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The New York

Statute at issue provides:
A Person is guilty of promoting a sexual
performance by a child when, knowing the
character and content thereof, he produces,
directs or promotes any performance which
includes sexual conduct by a child less than
sixteen years of age.
The New York Court of Appeals found the statute unconstitutionally overbroad "because it prohibited the distribution of

2
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materials produced outside the state, as well as materials, such
as medical books and educational sources,

which 'deal with

adolescent sex in a realistic but non-obscene manner.'" 52 N.Y.2d
681.

The United States Supreme Court granted

the

State's

Petition for Certiorari for the purpose of presenting the single
question:
To prevent the abuse of children who are made
to engage in sexual conduct for commercial
purposes, could the New York State Legislature, consistent with the First Amendment,
prohibit the dissemination of material which
shows children engaged in sexual conduct,
regardless of whether such material is obscene? 31 Cr.L. at 3141.
In answering the question, the Court first sets out the line
of cases previously discussed in Appellants' original brief in
which the Court has held that "obscenity is not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech or press." Roth vs. United
S~.a.t.g~,

354 US 476 at 485 (1957).

The

M.i.li~

standard the cur-

rent standard by which allegedly pornographic materials are
judged, is discussed, and then the Court makes the following
observation:
Like obscenity statutes, laws directed at the
dissemination of child pornography run the
risk of suppressing protected expression by
allowing the hand of the censor to become
unduly heavy.
For the following reasons,
however, we are persuaded that the states are
entitled to greater leeway in the regulation
of pornographic depictions of children. 31
Cr.L. at 3142.
The Court, in presenting the question for decision, and in making

3
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the comment referred to above, uses the terms "sexual conduct"
and "child pornography."

The Court then finds that:

The prevention of sexual exploitation and
abuse of child constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance • • • • The
legislative judgment, as well as the judgment
found in the relevant literature, is that the
use of children as subjects of pornographic
materials is harmful to physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child. 31
Cr.L. at 3142
The Court then goes on to find that allowing the dissemination of
such "pornographic materials" involving the depiction of "sexual
activity by juveniles" contributes to the harm described above.
The Court explains why the use of the

Mii~

standard is not

satisfactory in this situation:
Thus, the question under the ll.i..l.l.~ test of
whether a work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest of the average person
bears no connection to the issue of whether a
child has been physically or psychologically
harmed in the production of the work. Similarly, a sexually explicit depiction need not
be "patently offensive" in order to have
required the sexual exploitation of a child
for its production.
In addition, a work
which, taken on the whole, contains serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value may nevertheless embody the hardest
core of child pornography. 31 Cr.L. at 3143
Further, the Court states:
The value of permitting live performances and
photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly
modest, if not .Q~_mi.n.imis.
We consider it
unlikely that visual depictions of chilaren
performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting
their aenitals would often constitute an
irnport~nt and necessary part of a literary
4
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performance or scientific or educational
work. As the trial court in this case observed, if it were necessary for literary or
artistic value, a person over the statutory
age who perhaps looked younger could be utilized. Simulation outside of the prohibition
of the statute could provide another
alternative.
31 Cr.L. at 3143.
In deciding that the states are to be given more leeway
handling the problems of child pornography than in handling otl
allegedly "obscene" materials,
the .r.e.I..QjU:. Court still

produced by and aimed at adul

sets some

stiff

standards:

There are, of course, limits on the category
of child pornography which, like obscenity,
is unprotected by the First Amendment. As
with all legislation in this sensitive area,
the conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the applicable state law, as
written or authoritatively construed. Here
the nature of the harm to be cornbatted requires that the state offense be limited to
works that visually depict sexual conduct by
children below a specified age. The category
of 'sexual conduct' proscribed must also be
suitably limited and described.
The test for child pornography is separate
from the obscenity standard enunciated in
.Mill.e..t:, bu t may be c om pa r e d to i t f or p u r pose
of clarity. The Miller formulation is adjusted in the following respects: A trier of
fact need not find that the material appeals
to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not required that sexual conduct
portrayed be done so in a patently offensive
manner: and the material at issue need not be
considered as a whole.
We note that the
distribution of descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene, which do not involve live performance
or photographic or other visual reproduction
of live performances, retains First Amendment
protection. As with obscenity laws, cri~inal
responsibility may not be imposed without
5
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some element of scienter on the part of the
defendant. (citations omitted) 31 Cr.L. at
3144.
Further, the Ferber Court observes that, in section 263.15:
The forbidden acts to be depicted are listed
with sufficient precision and represent the
kind of conduct that, if it were the theme of
a work, could render it legally obscene:
'actual or siraulated sexual intercourse,
deviant sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sadomascastic abuse, and,
or lewd exhibition of the genitals. Section
263.3.
The term "lewd exhibition of the
genitals" is not unknown
in this area
and, indeed, was given in M.ill~~ as an
example of a permissible regulation.
413
U.S., at 25 ••
We hold that section 263.15 sufficiently
describes a category of material the
production and distribution of which is not
entitled to first amendment protection. It is
therefore clear that there is nothing
unconstitutionally 'underinclusive' about a
statute that singles out this catagory of
material for proser iption.
31 Cr.L. at 3144.
The court, at the end of the last statement cited, inserts a
footnote that is of extreme importance to the case at issue here:
.E..t.Z.ll..QZn.i.k_y_._,Cil;i._.Q.L.J._g c k.§..Q.ll.Y.i.l~ 4 2 2 U. S.

205 (1975), relied upon by the Court of Appeals, struck down a law against drive-in
theaters showing nude scenes if movies could
be seen from a public place. Since nudity,
without more is protected expression, id., at
213,
we proceeded to consider the
underinclusiveness of the ordinance.
The
Jacksonville ordinance impermissably singled
out movies with nudity for special treatment
while failing to regulate other protected
speech which created the same alleged risk to
traffic.
Today, we hold that child
pornography as defined in section 263.15 is
unprotected speech subject to content-based
regulation. Hence, it cannot be underinclus6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ive or unconstitutional for a State to do
precisely that. (Footnote) 31 Cr.L. at 3144.
A review of the statements made by the Supreme Court in
deciding the

.f~~b~I

matter easily refutes the contentions of

Respondent in Point I and III of its brief.
th a t the

.£..e~b.eI

Respondent argues

case means th a t "the r e a r e no s p e e ch or exp res-

sion issues involved in the act of sexual exploitation of a
minor" (Respondent's brief page 6) and that "the Appellants have
no standing to raise first amendment arguments."

(id.)

Again on

page 10 of respondent's brief is the statement:
There are, however, no speech or expression
activities involved in employing, using,
persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a
minor to pose in the nude for the purpose of
sexual arousal or for profit, or ~o engage in
sexual or simulated sexual conduct anymore
than there are speech or expression
activities involved in rape, robbery, or
murder.
In fact, the Supreme Court in the .f..e.t..btl matter, says exactly
the opposite.

The court clearly describes the production and

dissemination of child pornography as "unprotected speech" (31
Cr.L. at 3144).

The court recognizes (id.) that legislation in

this area is still within the "sensitive area" of first amendment
regulation.

Because of that fact,

on such legislation.

the court puts clear "limits"

The most notable limit is that the material

must involve "sexual conduct" and it appears that the conduct
must be the kind of conduct "that, if it were the theme of a
work, could render it legally obscene" (id.).

In fact, the court

7
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most clearly excludes nudity (without more) stating that such
nudity is "protected expressionq (id.).
United State Supreme Court in

Thus, the opinion of the

~li ~~~k y £~~~

reinforces the

arguments of appellants in their original brief, and does not
take the conduct of the appellants out of the first amendment
area, as stated by respondents.

Appellants have argued,

and

continue to argue, that the inclusion of nudity as proscribed
conduct renders the statute here hopelessly overbroad.

The con-

duct proscribed by section 76-10-1206.5 goes well beyond the
sexual activity of the kind that could render it legally obscene.
In fact,

counsel for appellants has observed numerous violations

of the statute on public television and in popular movies shown
in

Ut~h,

since the filing of the original brief.

The makers of

"Buggies" and "Luvs" diapers regularly show females under the age
of 18 with exposed breasts in their television commercials (or at
least they appear to be females with the names "Michelle",
"Katy", "Maggie", and "Sarah").

The movie

~.a .S...e.~,

shown on

Channel 20 (KSTU Television, Salt Lake City) on September 10,
1982, showed a baby, completely naked from the rear, while being
bath ed.

The rnov i e

shown at many theaters in Utah,

SJ.U2..e.LID..9..Il .Il.,

showed a very young boy completely naked, from a frontal view, at
the beginning of the movie.

such examples continue to abound,

and are clear violations of the statute, as worded.

It is as-

sumed, of course, that very few people involved in the production
and distribution of such films and commercials were sexually
8
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aroused in the process.

Perhaps,

however,

a trial would be

necessary to prove or disprove that assumption.

It is equally

clear, of course, that the production and distribution of the
f ilrns and commercials were done for profit.

Respondent scoffs at

the mention of such examples by appellants as a "parade of horribles" and states that appellants have no standing to raise such
examples (respondent's brief page 13).

Appellants admit that it

is highly unlikely that these corporate law violators will ever
be brought to answer for their conduct.

In fact, it appears that

the alleged misconduct of appellants was brought to the attention
of the authorities by a frustrated narcotics investigator who had
sought unsuccessfully to obtain evidence against appellants in
other crimes

(R.

4).

Certainly the "parade of horribles," cited

by respondent, of the spectre of reputable businessmen being
arrested for violation of this statute will never occur.

Perhaps

it will only be used against those who already have incurred the
wrath of the authorities for living supposedly "deviant" life
styles.

It is just that highly questionable use of the enforce-

rnent apparatus which appellants protest.
POINT II
AS APPLIED TO THESE APPELLANTS, THE STATUTE IS BOTH UNCONSTITUTIONl1LLY VAGUE AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD.

Respondent,

in Point II of its brief, contends that even if

the statute at issue here is overbroad as to some potential
defendants,

it

is not as applied

to these defendants,

9
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and

appellants therefore have no standing to assert the rights of
others in this action.

As already indicated in Point I of this

Reply Brief, the recent decision in
the argument of Respondent

~H X.Q.t.k y ~~~L

destroys

that we are dealing in an area out-

side traditional forms of speech, and outside the protections of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

In fact, the guidelines given by the Supreme Court in

that case show that the State of Utah went too far in its prosecution of these Defendants, and the law is indeed overbroad as
applied to these Defendants.

In the Information the Defendants

are charged with having:
• • • used, persuaded, induced, or enticed
Holly Wilkerson, a minor, .t.Q 12.Qil .in .the
filH~~ • • • •
(emphasis added) (R. 2).
In fact, it is clear from the record that the claim of nudity was
an important part of the state's case.

At pre-trial hearings,

the State's counsel argued long and hard that "this is not a
pornography case" (R. 109).

In referring to the statute, counsel

for Plaintiff stated "all it says is that
Qig tu_t:._e~

of

a

min or

engaging

(emphasis added) (R. 110).
in

2-Q.Y

can't

~~~ n~

in simulated sexual conduct"

Again, at the end of the State's case

chief, during arguments on Defendants' motions to dismiss,

there

occurred

this exchange between the Court and

prosecutor:
THE COURT: Not used in the Information. All
right. I think your word is 'used,' used 'a
minor.'
And then you go, 'to pose in the
10
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the

nude -- ' No, used her to engage in 'simulated sexual conduct for the purpose of photographing. '
MR. WATSON:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, that in a nutshell, is what
you are claiming, is that so?
MR. WATSON:

And, 'in the nude.'

(R.

153).

In his summation, the prosecutor stated "the evidence is clear
that both of these defendants used the person of Holly Wilkerson
~~ ~

i.n .t.h..e.

Il.Y~

while simulating sexual conduct (emphasis

added) (R. 169).
In support of its case, the state introduced thirty Kodak
instant pictures proporting to show the minor nude, and some of
which allegedly involve the simulating of sexual conduct.

Many

of the photographs were objected to (R. 131) by Defendant Jordan
as not showing simulated sexual conduct, as charged.

The Court

took that objection under advisement, and never die rule on it.
It appears, however, in the end, that all of the photographs were
considered as evidence of the crime charged.
The evidence at trial was uncontroverted in that there was
no sexual activity involved between the minor and either of the
Defendants (R. 137).

While it may appear that there was "sirnu-

lated sexual conduct," that cannot be deterrr.ined because of the
failure of the state to specify what simulated sexual conduct is.
The .£..e..r..Q..e...r Co u r t ,

( S up r a ) , s ta t ea " a s w i th a 11 1 e g i s 1 a t i on in

this sensitive area, the conduct to be prohibited must be
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adequately defined by the applicable state law, ••••
at 3144.

31 cr.L.

The New York Statute defined the term "simulated," and

the Supreme Court found that definition adequate.
Law [NcKinney] Section 263.00).

(See NY Penal

Since we have not been told what

constituted "simulated sexual conduct" and since it is impossible
to tell from the record whether the nude photography or the
photography of the alleged "simulated sexual conduct" was the
conduct for which appellants were convicted, the conviction cannot stand.
POINT III
APPELLANTS DO HAVE THE STANDING TO RAISE FACIAL OVERBREADTH
OF THIS STATUTE AS A DEFENSE TO PROSECUTION.
Respondents further claim that appellants have no standing
to attack the validity of section 76-10-1206.5 citing the general
principle:
• • • that no one should be entitled to
challenge the statute and have it declared
void because it may unjustly affect someone
else, but could properly do so only if his
own rights are adversly affected. S.t.g_t~ y
Phillips 540 P.2d 936 (Utah 1975).
Respondents

dismiss

the

case

cited by Appellants

in their

original brief (Doran y Salem l.nn, 422 U.S. 930) as applying only
to declaratory judgment actions.
totally

ignore

the

reasons

for

Respondents,
the

in so doing,

adoption,

jurisdictions, of declaratory judgment statutes.

by

many

These statutes

have been enacted in an effort to allow those who might be

12
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charged with a crime to litigate the validity of a law without
first having to be arrested and take the chance of going to jail.
The adoption of these statutes,

however,

did not replace an

arrested person's right to contest the validity of a law in a
criminal proceeding.

While respondents are correct in their

citing of the general rule, there is a long line of cases (both
criminal and noncriminal) indicating that this rule does not
apply in first amendment cases.

Since the

~~rbgr

Court (in a

criminal case) clearly upheld Appellants' contention that this is
a First Amendment case, the rule which applies to First Amendment
cases must be carefully examined.

The Court state, in regard to

the general principle:
What has come to be known as the First
Amendmendment overbreadth doctrine is one of
the few exceptions to this general principle
and must be justified by "weighty
countervaling policies."
(citations omitted).
The doctrine is predicated on the
sensitive nature of protected expression:
"persons whose expression is constitutionally
protected may well ref rain from exercising
their rights for fear of criminal sanctions
by a statute susceptible of application to
protected expression." (citations omitted).
It is for this reason that we have alloweo
persons to attack overly broad statutes even
though the conduct of the person making the
attack is clearly unprotected and could be
proscribed by a law drawn with the requsite
specificity.
(citations omitted).
The scope of the First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine, like most exceptions to established
principles, must be carefully tied to the
circumstances in which facial invalidation of
a statute is truly warranted. Because of the
wide-reaching effects of striking a statute
13
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down on its face at the request of one whose
conduct may be punished despite the First
Amendment, we have recognized that the overbr eadth doctrine is "strong medicine" and
have employed it with hesitation, and then
"only as a last resort."
(citations omitted). We have, in consequence, insisted that
the overbreadth involved be "substantial"
before the statute involved with be invalidated on its face. 31 Cr.L. at 3145.
The United States Supreme Court, back in 1949, recognized
that even a person whose activity

may be constitutionally

regulated may argue that the statute under which he is convicted
or regulated is invalid on its face.
.c.i.t.y Q!

~~~.9.Q,

The Court, in

~iniello

y

337 U.S. 1, was faced with an appeal by a man

convicted of disorderly conduct for a speech given at a rally.
The Court commented:
Accordingly a function of free speech under
our system of government is to invite dispute.
That is why freed om of speech,
(citations omitted) is nevertheless protected
against censorship or punishment, unless
shown likely to produce a clear and present
danger of a serious substantive evil that
rises far beyond public inconvenience,
annoyance, or unrest. 337 U.S. at 4.
The ordinance as construed by the trial court
seriously invaded this province.
It permitted conviction of petitioner if his speech
stirred people to anger, invited public
dispute, or brought about a condition of
unrest. A conviction resting on any of those
grounds may not stand.
As we have s a id , the g 1 o s s wh i ch I 11 in o i s
placed on the ordinance gives it a meaning
and application which are conclusive on us.
we need not consider whether as construed it
is defective in its entirety. As construed
and applied it at least contains parts that
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are unconstitutional, the verdict was a
general one; and we do not know on this
record, but what it may rest on the invalid
clauses. 337 U.S. at 5.
As in the

~miniello

case, even if only parts of the statute are

invalid, it is impossible in this case

to tell

whether the

conviction rested on the invalid clauses.
In the 1960 case of the lln.ill.Q

.5..t..9.~ Y. .E~~,

362 U.S. 17,

the Court further elaborated on the First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine.

The Court there said:
For example, where, as a result of the very
litigation in question, the constitutional
rights of one not a party would be impaired,
and where he has no effective way to preserve
them himself, the Court may consider those
rights as before it. 362 U.S. at 22.

Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), the Court held:
Given a case or controversy, a litigant whose
own activities are unprotected may neverthe1 ess challenge a statute by showing that it
substantially abridges the First Amendment
rights of other parties not before the Court.
444 U.S. at 634.
Appellants in this case seek to exactly that.

The reasons

for the overbreadth doctrine were explained more fully in the
case of

U~IDQLQ~Jiki Y. £f.i..§~~~,

380 U.S. 479 (1965).

The Court

there explained:
A criminal prosecution under a statute regu1 at in g expression usually
involves
imponderables and contingencies that
themselves may inhibit the full exercise of
First Amendment freedoms.
(citations omitted).
When the statutes also have an
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overbroad sweep, as is here alleged, the
hazard of loss or substantial impairment of
those precious rights may be critical. For
in such cases, the statutes lend themselves
too rea?ily to denial of those rights. The
assumption that defense of a criminal prosecution will generally assure ample vindication of constitutionally rights is unfounded
in such cases.
(citations omitted}. Because
of the sensitive nature of constitutionally
protected expression, we have not required
that all of those subject to overbroad
regulations risk prosecution to test their
rights.
For free expression -- of transcendent value to all society, and not merely to
those exercising their rights -- might be the
loser. (citations omitted). For example, we
have consistently allowed attacks on overly
broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his
own conduct could not be regulated by a
statute drawn with the requisite narrow
specificity. (citations omitted). We have
fashioned this exception to the usual rules
governing standing, (citations omitted)
because of the ". • • danger of tolerating,
in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the
existence of a penal statute susceptible of
sweeping and irr.proper application." (citations omitted}. If the rule were otherwise,
the contours of regulation would have to be
hammered out case by case -- and tested only
by those hardy enough to risk criminal prosecution to determine the proper scope of regulation. 380 U.S. at 486, 487.
In the 1974 case of

~k~

y

~~,

417 U.S. 733, the Court

reiterated that the same standards under the First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine apply in defense of criminal prosecution as
in civil enforcement or actions involving a declaratory judgment.
(See 417 U.S. 733 at 760.)

The Court there repeated the prin-

cipal ear lier enuncia tea in the case of Broderick vs. Oklahoma,
413 US 601 (1973) that:
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"Where conduct and not merely speech is
involved" the overbreadth must "not only be
real, but substantial as well, judged in
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep." 417 US at 760; 413 us, at 615.
The Ferber Court recognizes that the use of children to make
sexually explicit materials for distribution
as speech (see 31 CrL at 3146).

is conduct as well

The Court there simply finds

that the New York Statute that prohibits commercial distribution
of the specific material discussed in that case is not substantially overbroad.

In finding so, the Court makes the following

observation:
While the reach of the statute is directed at
the hardcore of child pornography, the Court
of Appeals was understandably concerned that
some protected expression, ranging from medical text books to pictorials in National
Geographic would fall prey to the statute.
How often, if ever, it may be necessary to
employ children to engage in conduct clearly
within the reach of the section 263.15 in
order to produce educational, medical or
artistic works cannot be known with certainty. x.eLlie ser iou~.Q.QJJ.Qt. and it has not
been suagested that these arguably impermissible applications of the statute amount to
more than a tiny fraction of the materials
~i~hin_~~-~_t.a.ty~~~gh.
(emphasis added) (31 Cr.L. at 3146.)
The Court's action,

then,

in upholding the New York Statute

on its face and as applied to Paul Ferber is done very clearly
because,

while

applications,

the

statute may

have

sor.ie unconstitutional

those applications will never amount to more than

"a tiny fraction of the materials within the statute's reach."
(supra).

Because the

statute at issue here is so broad as to
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include a wide range of artistic, educational and scientific
works, the same treatment cannot be given this statute as was
given the New York Statute.

Additionally, it should be noted

that "the penalty to be imposed is relevant in determining
whether demonstrable overbreadth is substantial."
3146.

31 Cr.L. at

The penalties set forth by section 76-10-1206.5 may be

appropriate when "directed at the hardcore of child pornography"
(supra).

But they are not appropriate for the many kinds of

conduct well short of "the hardcore of child pornography" proscribed by the statute at issue here.

In fact, the trial judge

found the conduct of Appellants herein as not meriting the harsh
treatment of the statute, and so granted motions by both Appellants to sentence under the next lowest category of offense,
which was as far as he could go in using his discretion to
diminish the punishment.
It should be noted here that the expression of the Court in
E~I~I

that the impermissible reach of the statute would only

amount to "a tiny fraction" of the materials covered was followed
by what amounts

to a warning.

The New York Statute, unlike

Utah's, prohibits the use of children for "lewd exhibition of the
genitals."

The Court warned (at P. 3146):
Nor will we assume that the New York courts
will widen the possibly invalid reach of the
statute by giving an expansive construction
to the proscription on 'lewd exhibition[s] of
the genitals.

18
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What the Court was warning New York not to do was precisely what
Utah has done, and what it cannot do.
CONCLUSION
The Ferber court limited the question at issue to a determination of whether the legislature could protect "children who are
made to engaged in sexual conduct for commercial purposes."
Nobody in this case was made to do anything she had not volunteered

to do,

involved.

and

no commercial

purposes

whatsoever

were

While, then, the New York "child pornography" law was

not substantially overbroad, the Utah Law, which is not a pornography law at all but far more (R. 109) is indeed substantially
overbroad and should be struck down by this Court so a proper one
can be written.

The Supreme Court in

the.£~~

case has made it

abundantly clear that a law can be written to protect minors from
sexual abuse without abusing the rights of a large segment of the
adult population.

Utah has not done this, and should be instruc-

ted by this Court to get that job done.
Respectfully submitted this

~r4f'-day

of October, 1982.

ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN

MCCULLOUGH, JONES & BARLOW

W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH

Attorney for Appellants
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